McGovern and Polk’s Disappointing Analysis and Plan

On my long flight, I read a short book, Out of Iraq: A Practical Plan for Withdrawal Now, by George McGovern and William R. Polk. It had been enthusiastically recommended by a friend whose judgement I value. (He’s a self-described “libertarian Democrat”–a lifelong Democrat who’s become convinced of the inherent worth and practical applicability of libertarian principles.) It was a disappointment. My friend had praised it for realistically cataloguing what would be involved in a U.S. withdrawal, including how much it would cost, how long it would take, etc. I am convinced that precisely such analysis, such realism, and such proposals are vital to the success of a disengagement plan. Unfortunately, most of the practical elements amount to a shopping list of how much the U.S. should pay an Iraqi government to revamp hospitals, infrastructure, etc., how much the U.S. should pay an Iraqi government to finance police forces, how much the U.S. should pay an Iraqi government to hire foreign troops to police the country while it gets its act in order, how much the U.S. should pay an Iraqi government to provide restitution to victims of U.S. military force, etc., etc. The numbers are all simply drawn out of a hat, with almost no evidence that the sums would suffice, that they would in fact cover the expenses, etc. Moreover, the logistical issues of a U.S. withdrawal are not even mentioned.

The analysis also suffers from a lack of documentation and from some really remarkably silly statements. The lack of documentation was irritating because they sometimes make assertions that seem unlikely or at least surprising, such as that “city moneylenders” under the British-backed monarchy were responsible for “driving down” “their Shia fellow tribesmen into serfdom.” (There are also a number of garbled statistical claims and historically or demographically sloppy claims that should have been corrected, such as the claim that all of the Kurds are Muslims, when in fact there are non-Muslim Kurdish minorities, and that “Shiis (Arabic ‘partisans’) differ from Sunnis in being influenced by ancient Persian religion and coming from a different historical and social background.”) Moreover, they rest too much of their argument on the dubious claim that the insurgency was entirely a response to U.S. violence, notably a case of firing on demonstrators [‘Their demand was basic — food.’], that that demonstration “triggered the first serious attack in American forces” and that “That was the beginning of the Iraqi insurgency.” No mention of the role of Ba’athist officers, weapons dumps, and hundreds of millions of dollars looted from the national bank, nor of the involvement of nearby states. Al Qaeda in Iraq is completely dismissed as unimportant, despite the role it played in deliberately provoking violent conflict between Sunni and Shia Arabs, most spectacularly in February with the destruction of the shrine at Samarra. The point is not that real anger at outrages or mistakes or criminal action by U.S. forces was irrelevant or unimportant, but that McGovern and Polk have written what amounts to a mere mirror-image of the neo-conservative defenses of the war, a one-sided defense of the insurgents.

What is needed to make the case is a clear account by someone who understands military logistics, has a realistic approach to hard choices (i.e., making a choice among a number of options, all of which have problems), and can present a clear argument for U.S. withdrawal.

For fun, I’m reading and enjoying Anthony Everitt’s Augustus.

UPDATE: Apologies for the grammatical mess of this post when I first posted it; that’s what comes from being exhausted, dealing with jet lag, and having an internet connection that kept booting me off whenever I tried to save the posting.