CNN reports claims that the Secretary of State was deliberately misled on WMD.
Being misled is one thing; knowingly misleading is another. When the case was made to the public, I wasn’t persuaded, and therefore opposed the decision to go to war. But I didn’t think that the evidence had been presented in bad faith. (And this story suggests that the evidence was presented by the Secretary of State in good faith, but not presented to him in good faith.) Will we ever get to the bottom of this?
I believe that the charge that Colin Powell was deceived isn’t that new, what’s interesting here is the source (Powells’ own right hand man).
Recall that Paul O’Neill, Bush’s first Treasury Secretary, maintains that from day 1 the administration was planning the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and used the 9-11 attack as an excuse for this, despite a lack of evidence or logic connecting fighting Al Qaeda and invading Iraq.
“planning the overthrow of Saddam”…why not as this was US policy ever since the late ’90s?
“lack of … logic” – Lieberman: “The terrorists are intent on stopping [Iraqi democracy] by instigating a civil war to produce the chaos that will allow Iraq to replace Afghanistan as the base for their fanatical war-making.”
I knew the lies would be flying from 9/12/01, at least — whatever day it was that George W. Bush declared a “war on terrorism.” Not on the terrorists who attacked us, but “a war on terrorism” as such. This is open-ended, and prescribed a never-ending war. To expect anything but lies at that point seems almost naive.
Mr. Campbell’s comments are of a type we’ve become quite familiar with in recent years. Was it U.S. policy to overthrow Saddam H.? By what act of Congress? Mr. Campbell has apparently abandoned the Constitution and all limits on what an administration may do. The fact that the Clinton administration was getting a bit more vexed about the contained dictatorship of Saddam H. is interesting, but not exactly a justification of a policy.
The Lieberman quotation is very funny. Al Qaeda started attacking Iraq after the U.S. attacked Iraq and took charge. Then they had a popular cause to do so. And a destabilized system to pry into. Justifying an attack on Iraq by the opportunism of terrorists AFTER that attack is lunatic. But precisely the kind of thing we’ve been hearing from the current administration since 9/11. Non sequitur after non sequitur.
Congress did pass a law in 1998 calling for regime change in Iraq. Its most practical element was funding for Chalabi’s group.
According to an interesting story by Scott Ritter, regime change has been the more-or-less secret goal of U.S. policy ever since the first Gulf War. At least partly to avoid Iranian domination of Iraq, the destruction of the Iraqi regime by invasion was rejected at that time. Instead, continuing pressure was put upon Iraq, particularly the oil embargo, along with efforts to organize a coup. After Saddam was gone, the U.S. would make peace with the “new regime.” This policy continued throughout the Clinton years.
My opinion is this is about face-saving. But, I suppose those making the policy might really believe the “evil man” theory and really believe that Saddam must be replaced by some new despot who wouldn’t be completely evil. (I guess my theory is that they are all evil and that carrots and sticks must be used to constrain evil rulers.)
Maintaining the low grade state of war (misnamed containment by many) until Saddam was overthrown in a coup was the position of the liberal interventionists as well as the Republican realists. Ritter claims that the inspection regime was used to instigate the coup. In my opinion, one of the reasons why the “intelligence” about WMD was so bad is that WMD was the UN legalized excuse to maintain the pressure on Iraq. The US couldn’t find that Iraq had no WMD because then there would be no excuse under international law to maintain the low grade state of war (sanctions, no fly zones etc.) which was really aimed at motivating a coup.
The neo-conservatives, as well as Rumsfield and Cheny, changed the existing policy to one of invasion, conquest, and forced regime change. Doubtful intelligence that had been used during the Clinton years to provide a justification under international law to maintain sanctions was used to justify a full scale invasion and conquest.
So, there was a consensus in favor of “regime change,” and a consensus that weak intelligence would be interpreted to maintain that Iraq still had WMD. The dispute is whether the policy should have been a low-grade war until an Iraqi coup occured or else an full scale invasion imposing a regime change from outside.
My own opinion is that the U.S. should have made peace with Iraq after 911. Well, I really think we should have made peace after Iraqi troops were expelled from Kuwait. But 911 provided an excellent excuse to change policy. Just like we demanded Pakistan give up its support for the Taliban and Al Quaeda and then became friendly when they accepted those demands, the U.S. should have done the same with Iraq and Syria. Not that they were helping Al Quaeda, but rather on the grounds that Al Quaeda is a common enemy. Everything changed after 911. We should have made it clear that if Syria or Iraq began to act like the Taliban in Afghanistan in the future, or even like Pakistan had been behaving in the past (with its alliance with the Taliban and Al Quaeda), then they would get the same treatment as the Taliban in Afghanistan.
But that is my view. I can understand how others might instead recongize that our longstanding policy of “pressue” (really low-grade war) against Iraq was unsustainable. Our international-law fig leaf that Iraq still had weapons of mass destruction couldn’t be maintained forever. Plus, the suffering of the Iraqi people, the maintenance of bases in Saudi Arabia from which the policy was implement were both used by Al Quaeda in its recruitment and financing efforts. It was time to lance the boil and finish Saddam.
The downside to that policy has always been that the Shia majority Iraq would end up as an ally of Iran and be a first step in subversion of the conservative Sunni dominated west Persian gulf–where all the oil is located. Personally, I don’t think that is the end of the world for the U.S. Invading Iraq, pushing Saddam from power, and turning things over the the Shia (who will be supported by Iran) seems plausible enough to me.
What I find extremely doubtful is any policy that insists on maintaining a unfied Iraq under a pro-U.S. regime. For example, having Chalabi be an Iraqi strongman kept in control through U.S. power. (And have him make peace with Israel, like Mubarek or, better yet, be like Turkey and nominally ally with Israel.)
Even worse, is a real pie-in-the-sky fantasy of having the U.S. directly run Iraq for as long as it takes to make Iraq into a society where there is an Iraqi majority in favor of a U.S.-allied democratic capitalist regime.
I think there is plenty of evidence that neo-conservatives support the Noble Lie and so their claims that such is their goal are questionable. On the other hand, I think it may well be that Bush believes that Lie. So the U.S. has an impossible war aim.
I think Bush is sufficiently out of touch, that he will believe we are accomplishing that goal if the somewhat more realistic goal of a pro-U.S. strongman is accomplished. He even appears to be willing to call turning Iraq over to Shia allies of Iran a “victory.” In my opinion, if Iranian mullahs had overthrown an anti-U.S. regime (say, one like Iraq) and had a reasonably pro-U.S. foreign policy (like Pakistan,) we would be holding up Iran’s domestic policies (limited democracy constrained by Islamist clergy) as a model! The fact that they really overthrew a pro-U.S. despot and have this anti-U.S. foreign policy as part of their national ideology is why we find that their regime’s domestic policies are unacceptable.
I think the best way for the U.S. to get out of this situation is to accept that pro-Iranian Shiites will rule, and work to hand them power and get the U.S. out. The Iraqi people elected them. We may not approve of them, but it is their country. Saddam is gone, there have been elections, and while they weren’t perfectly free, the regime appears to be supported by the majority.
When this is complete, and the issue becomes whether the “sucess” in Iraq is a good model for regime change in Iran or Syria, then we can point out that things didn’t turn out so great in Iraq–that Saddam’s Sunni torturers have been replaced by pro-Iranian Badr group torturers.
I am trully puzzled by these complaints that the Iraqi police and military have been inflitrated by Shia militia. Gee, they are taking orders from…the people who won the elections and run the government! It makes me wonder to what degree there are people who still hope for the Turkish model. There will be this secular, pro-West military who _not_ follow the orders of the elected civilian leadership!
To Richard — Your initial comment (“planning the overthrow of Saddam”…why not as this was US policy ever since the late ’90s? ) confuses two quite different things: the U.S. government did indeed call for regime change in Iraq. But that is quite a different thing from deciding that the U.S. military should be the agent of regime change. And the sort of specific planning that O’Neill describes as ongoing in the administrations first week (e.g. who gets which oilfield) is again a third (and different) thing.
In 1998-9, for example, there was a debate in Foreign Affairs as to whether the U.S. should push for regime change, and also whether or not the U.S. should overthrow Saddam. It was not a decided-upon policy; I recall a letter to editor in FA by Paul Wolfowitz and (I think) Steven Solaris) arguing for the hawk position. (I’ll get the citation on request.)
As for your second comment — it was the U.S. invasion that made al Qaeda’s foray into Iraq posible. If the goal had been to destroy al Qaeda, the U.S. should have directed its force elsewhere (e.g. al Qaeda strongholds).
I think Bill’s first six paragraphs are a correct summary of the history of U.S. policy, and that this can be documented readily.
Again to Richard — (I didn’t finish my first point I fear)… The point is that a U.S. invasion was *not* U.S. policy. The Bush administration took it upon itself to make this the secret centerpiece of its foreign policy, according to O’Neill.
There are many reasons why this is objectionable but let’s stick to two: 1) Going to war should be a matter of public debate, yet in January 2001 the Bush administration was working on its war plans. 2) Only Congress, not the President, has the legal right to make this decision.
If conservatives really cared about the Constitution they’d be clamoring for the impeachment of Bush (and a substantial proportion of Congress as well).
What’s to wonder?
Tom asks “Will we ever get to the bottom of this?” To me, this is sterile debate; I’m unpersuaded there’s any “bottom” to get to for at least four or five reasons.
First, there were two high-level independent investigations – the SSCI and Lord Butler commission – joined by a third – the Robb-Silberman – that looked into the intel failure/manipulation issue. I’ve only examined the Bulter Report on WMD and it’s looks pretty solid. None of the other reports found intel personel intimidated or compromised. Even General Tommy Franks book after the war states that Jordanian, Egyptian, Saudi, and other ME nations intel people beilieved Saddam had WMD. So, like I asked above, what’s to wonder?
Second, reports like the president’s own CIA prepared PDRs (Presidential Daily Briefings) were more alarming about Saddam’s WMD threat than other intel products like the October 2003 National Intelligence Estimate – a compendium from some 15 intel services – which Bush has cited recently in defending against protracted speculative criticism.
Third, it turns out that Saddam did indeed want WMD, especially nukes, and WAS merely biding his time to get them. But instead of opening up, as per the Gulf War Peace Treaty and 17 compulsory UN Resolutions, Saddam relied on buying protection from our friends and “allies” on the UN Security Council like France, Russia, and China. It’s becuase of the latter that explains why he didn’t believe Bush would actually invade Iraq; Saddam actually believed Bush was a paper tiger who would toady to a UN Saddam had corrupted so successfully through OFF.
Mahdi Obeidi’s “The Bomb in My Garden” (2004), is the story of Saddam’s nuke scientist who perfected a working prototype of a uranium gas centrifuge, a crucial tool needed to enrich U238 and make nuclear weapons. This man, educated at the Colorado School of Mines in the US, was completely off everyone’s radar! Yet he claims that nuclear bombs could have been made in as little as 18 months (although others judge a few years were more likely). Saddam simply, literally, had it all buried in his yard for post-embargo resuscitation.
But what’s a few nukes to play with when you’re talking about most of the world’s oil supply? Does Tom mean to say this threat would be inconsequential for world capitalism? What’s an anti-statist, anti-militarist, anti-interventionist to do when there are still unresolved threats like like Saddam in the world?
“‘You begin to speculate, you begin to wonder — Was this intelligence spun? Was it politicized? Was it cherry-picked? Did in fact the American people get fooled? I’m beginning to have my concerns,’ Lawrence Wilkerson, chief of staff for former Secretary of State Colin Powell, said….” Well, consider the source: Wilkerson rose through the ranks of the anti-Bush professionally committed pro-stability caucus, ie, the State Department, and thus reflects a bureaucracy inured to stability and “diplomacy”, when the ME’s chief problem has been too much stability while the rest of the world evolves and adapts to modernity and globalization. It can be tough to teach old dogs new tricks.
The only real news in this interview by Wilkerson is this: “Lately, however, he said he had been troubled by disclosures that an informant known as Curveball, who supplied information about alleged mobile biological laboratories, was not reliable, and new information casting doubt on statements made by Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, an al Qaeda military instructor, claiming support from Iraq.” Contacts between Iraq and Al-Qaida were alleged by the latter, and this influenced Powell.
Now, to the second issue raised here, Steven Hayes has published a book with lots of excerpted documents on the Saddam-Al-Qaida connection and in the Weekly Standard. I have not kept up with these, but I do know that those who have claim the case for such a connection is considerably stronger now than in the run up to war. Furthermore, Hayes recent attempts to get post-war documents on the questionmade public have been blocked.
As for the first issue Wilkerson raised above, the questioned reliability of an apparent Iraqi intel source called “Curveball,” there is a cultural tradition in the Arab speaking ME that is quite alien to ours: tell your hosts what they want to hear! We live in a society that values criticism and debate – and as Christianity tells us, seeking the Truth, for “it will set you free.” Not so, there. This does not make intel gathering easy or reliable.
Finally, there is the fact that Saddam offered Bin Laden safe-haven in 1999. And the further fact that one of Uday/Qusay’s (I forget which was in charge of propaganda) newspaper in July 2001 had a story which identified NYC and Washington, DC as targets for coming attacks. See http://www.newsmax.com/archives/ic/2004/6/17/85557.shtml This was before 9/11.
And as a veteran of the Baghdad invasion said, don’t tell me there were no foreign terrorists in Iraq – me and my fellow marines fought hundreds of them on the road around Salmon Pak, south of the city. This was Saddam’s own terrorist training facility, including an airplane fuselage for hijacking practice. According to this source (heard locally on radio in Colorado), most of these “foreign terrorists” were Algerian.
Living in a free society, we seem to forget, and especially our intel agencies institutionally forget, precisely what a Stalinist fear-based society means for its citizens. Saddam wanted to maintain the illusion of having WMD for self-defense from invasion by Iran. As one Iraq war veteran said of his entry into El Anbar province, there were NBC suits “strewn in foxholes everywhere;” he said that in total, there were “truckloads” of them. Thus, even Saddam’s troops and generals believed the WMD lie.
The real issue of substance exposed by our intel failure in Iraq lies elsewhere. The real surprise not yet addressed by the Bushies or their critics is that we spend, maybe, a hundred billion dollars a year total on intel, and what does it get us? accurately, in recent decades? On major international security problems? Yugoslavia’s going to break up! – and not much more.
Here’s my endorsement for abolishing them all and starting fresh. Let’s call it a delayed Cold War peace-dividend, necessitated by the GWOT.
As for Tom’s complaint, shouldn’t he simply be happy, even thankful, that Saddam didn’t have WMD? A lot of people, plenty of them fellow Americans, did not die because he didn’t.
PS to Charles Steele – Paul O’Neil’s claims about early administration Iraq war planning were discredited under questioning after his book came out. For instance, claims made about “war planning maps” (eg, it’s all about ‘our’ oil) turned out to have Kuwaiti oil wells on them, not Iraqi. and thus O’Neil even distanced himself from his co-author, coming off indeed as Bush defenders painted him – intellectually challenged.
PPS – I voted for the questionable Badnarik in ’05 – a protest vote – not Bush.
What’s to wonder?
Tom asks “Will we ever get to the bottom of this?” To me, this is sterile debate; I’m unpersuaded there’s any “bottom” to get to for at least four or five reasons.
First, there were two high-level independent investigations – the SSCI and Lord Butler commission – joined by a third – the Robb-Silberman – that looked into the intel failure/manipulation issue. I’ve only examined the Bulter Report on WMD and it’s looks pretty solid. None of the other reports found intel personel intimidated or compromised. Even General Tommy Franks book after the war states that Jordanian, Egyptian, Saudi, and other ME nations intel people beilieved Saddam had WMD. So, like I asked above, what’s to wonder?
Second, reports like the president’s own CIA prepared PDRs (Presidential Daily Briefings) were more alarming about Saddam’s WMD threat than other intel products like the October 2003 National Intelligence Estimate – a compendium from some 15 intel services – which Bush has cited recently in defending against protracted speculative criticism.
Third, it turns out that Saddam did indeed want WMD, especially nukes, and WAS merely biding his time to get them. But instead of opening up, as per the Gulf War Peace Treaty and 17 compulsory UN Resolutions, Saddam relied on buying protection from our friends and “allies” on the UN Security Council like France, Russia, and China. It’s becuase of the latter that explains why he didn’t believe Bush would actually invade Iraq; Saddam actually believed Bush was a paper tiger who would toady to a UN Saddam had corrupted so successfully through OFF.
Mahdi Obeidi’s “The Bomb in My Garden” (2004), is the story of Saddam’s nuke scientist who perfected a working prototype of a uranium gas centrifuge, a crucial tool needed to enrich U238 and make nuclear weapons. This man, educated at the Colorado School of Mines in the US, was completely off everyone’s radar! Yet he claims that nuclear bombs could have been made in as little as 18 months (although others judge a few years were more likely). Saddam simply, literally, had it all buried in his yard for post-embargo resuscitation.
But what’s a few nukes to play with when you’re talking about most of the world’s oil supply? Does Tom mean to say this threat would be inconsequential for world capitalism? What’s an anti-statist, anti-militarist, anti-interventionist to do when there are still unresolved threats like like Saddam in the world?
“‘You begin to speculate, you begin to wonder — Was this intelligence spun? Was it politicized? Was it cherry-picked? Did in fact the American people get fooled? I’m beginning to have my concerns,’ Lawrence Wilkerson, chief of staff for former Secretary of State Colin Powell, said….” Well, consider the source: Wilkerson rose through the ranks of the anti-Bush professionally committed pro-stability caucus, ie, the State Department, and thus reflects a bureaucracy inured to stability and “diplomacy”, when the ME’s chief problem has been too much stability while the rest of the world evolves and adapts to modernity and globalization. It can be tough to teach old dogs new tricks.
The only real news in this interview by Wilkerson is this: “Lately, however, he said he had been troubled by disclosures that an informant known as Curveball, who supplied information about alleged mobile biological laboratories, was not reliable, and new information casting doubt on statements made by Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, an al Qaeda military instructor, claiming support from Iraq.” Contacts between Iraq and Al-Qaida were alleged by the latter, and this influenced Powell.
Now, to the second issue raised here, Steven Hayes has published a book with lots of excerpted documents on the Saddam-Al-Qaida connection and in the Weekly Standard. I have not kept up with these, but I do know that those who have claim the case for such a connection is considerably stronger now than in the run up to war. Furthermore, Hayes recent attempts to get post-war documents on the questionmade public have been blocked.
As for the first issue Wilkerson raised above, the questioned reliability of an apparent Iraqi intel source called “Curveball,” there is a cultural tradition in the Arab speaking ME that is quite alien to ours: tell your hosts what they want to hear! We live in a society that values criticism and debate – and as Christianity tells us, seeking the Truth, for “it will set you free.” Not so, there. This does not make intel gathering easy or reliable.
Finally, there is the fact that Saddam offered Bin Laden safe-haven in 1999. And the further fact that one of Uday/Qusay’s (I forget which was in charge of propaganda) newspaper in July 2001 had a story which identified NYC and Washington, DC as targets for coming attacks. See http://www.newsmax.com/archives/ic/2004/6/17/85557.shtml This was before 9/11.
And as a veteran of the Baghdad invasion said, don’t tell me there were no foreign terrorists in Iraq – me and my fellow marines fought hundreds of them on the road around Salmon Pak, south of the city. This was Saddam’s own terrorist training facility, including an airplane fuselage for hijacking practice. According to this source (heard locally on radio in Colorado), most of these “foreign terrorists” were Algerian.
Living in a free society, we seem to forget, and especially our intel agencies institutionally forget, precisely what a Stalinist fear-based society means for its citizens. Saddam wanted to maintain the illusion of having WMD for self-defense from invasion by Iran. As one Iraq war veteran said of his entry into El Anbar province, there were NBC suits “strewn in foxholes everywhere;” he said that in total, there were “truckloads” of them. Thus, even Saddam’s troops and generals believed the WMD lie.
The real issue of substance exposed by our intel failure in Iraq lies elsewhere. The real surprise not yet addressed by the Bushies or their critics is that we spend, maybe, a hundred billion dollars a year total on intel, and what does it get us? accurately, in recent decades? On major international security problems? Yugoslavia’s going to break up! – and not much more.
Here’s my endorsement for abolishing them all and starting fresh. Let’s call it a delayed Cold War peace-dividend, necessitated by the GWOT.
As for Tom’s complaint, shouldn’t he simply be happy, even thankful, that Saddam didn’t have WMD? A lot of people, plenty of them fellow Americans, did not die because he didn’t.
PS to Charles Steele – Paul O’Neil’s claims about early administration Iraq war planning were discredited under questioning after his book came out. For instance, claims made about “war planning maps” (eg, it’s all about ‘our’ oil) turned out to have Kuwaiti oil wells on them, not Iraqi. and thus O’Neil even distanced himself from his co-author, coming off indeed as Bush defenders painted him – intellectually challenged.
PPS – I voted for the questionable Badnarik in ’05 – a protest vote – not Bush.