Max Borders has written a very odd case for military interventionism and a hawkish foreign policy. Setting aside his tendency to overwrite (e.g., “Alas, were the threats of the twenty first century so simple to counter, the complexities of world so easily distilled”) and his misuse of the English language (e.g., the word “pace” and the term “hedge my bets”), I found it quite unpersuasive. Borders suggests that all libertarian opponents of the Iraq war are natural rights advocates (I’ve really no idea if that’s true or not and don’t think it really matters) and then claims, ex cathedra, that “We get rights by virtue of some sort of social contract, not from our Creator,” which he thinks implies that if you’re not part of the same social contract, “you are presumed ‘enemy’.”
Where to start with such claims? First, even social contract theory rests on some prior theory of rights, for it implies that people have the right to engage in the making of social contracts and that agreement (consent) is important, which can’t be established on the grounds that we agree that it’s important. (As an aside, I should point out that Borders is on weak ground when he makes sweeping claims about various philosophical positions. For example, he mischaracterizes Locke’s theory of the state of nature and confuses it with Hobbes’; for Locke the state of nature is purely relational, such that two people who live in or under different states are in a state of nature relative to each other, but that does not imply that they have no obligations or rights relative to each other. There is no reason to presume that someone not a part of a particular social contract is a presumed enemy.)
Second, Borders does not deal with the core classical liberal position that there is a general presumption against waging war. There is a very large and impressive tradition governing the waging of war (“just war theory”) and one of the important pillars on which it rests is that unless a war meets various criteria, it is unjustified. The burden of proof is always on the person justifying a war. War is not a good thing in and of itself. It may be a necessary evil, but it requires justification. Borders doesn’t address whether that burden was discharged in the Iraq war. I and others do not think that it was. Where is the argument that it was justified? Purple prose about an unfleshed-out theory that “rests neither on the foundational axioms associated with traditional moral theories, nor on the nihilism and disorderly assertions of the so-called Postmoderns” does not do the job. Arguments and evidence about threats to the U.S., evidence of WMD, evidence of collusion with Al Qaeda in the 9-11 attacks, and so forth are the stuff of such a justification, not irrelevant claims about Rawlsian constructivism and natural rights.
I’m sure that Mr. Borders is a fine and intelligent person, but he ought to think a bit more carefully — and maybe even pass his articles around the office and ask for criticisms — before publishing sweeping claims about important matters of war and peace.
P.S. Will Wilkinson has a post discussing Borders’ essay.
Allow me to preface all of this by saying I have always admired Mr. Palmer and his work at Cato. I hope this exchange will give me the opportunity to meet him in person (I’m ready to take my beating).
First, Mr. Palmer chides me on both verbosity and poor grammar: …his misuse of the English language (e.g., the word “pace” and the term “hedge my bets”), I found it [the article] quite unpersuasive.
If only the editorial staff at TCS had the pedants on staff to find poor phrasing like ‘hedging one’s bets.’ I can see how I should have used “place my bets,” since to hedge is really more to balance one’s bets in order to guard against risk. Thanks to Mr. Palmer for pointing out this subtlety. As for the term pace (roughly, with the consent of) – I am still not clear as to how I misused the term. I’m sure Mr. Palmer will tell me, however.
Let me address some of Mr. Palmer’s points in turn:
Palmer: First, even social contract theory rests on some prior theory of rights, for it implies that people have the right to engage in the making of social contracts and that agreement (consent) is important, which can’t be established on the grounds that we agree that it’s important.
I’m afraid not, Mr. Palmer. No respectable contractarian theory rests on any prior notion of rights. (See Buchanan, Narveson, Gauthier and Hobbes to drop a few.) If such theories you’ve read rest on the presumption of rights, they are circular arguments and they rest on spurious claims to moral realism.
Palmer: (As an aside, I should point out that Borders is on weak ground when he makes sweeping claims about various philosophical positions. For example, he mischaracterizes Locke’s theory of the state of nature and confuses it with Hobbes’; for Locke the state of nature is purely relational, such that two people who live in or under different states are in a state of nature relative to each other, but that does not imply that they have no obligations or rights relative to each other. There is no reason to presume that someone not a part of a particular social contract is a presumed enemy.)
In the context of a TCS piece, my intention was to contrast Hobbes and Locke in terms of how they arrive at rights. Locke uses a theological justification, where Hobbes uses the notion of covenants. I did not mean to compare or contrast each thinker’s different conception of the social contract, as Mr. Palmer has improperly accuses me of doing.
Palmer: Second, Borders does not deal with the core classical liberal position that there is a general presumption against waging war. There is a very large and impressive tradition governing the waging of war (“just war theory”) and one of the important pillars on which it rests is that unless a war meets various criteria, it is unjustified. The burden of proof is always on the person justifying a war. War is not a good thing in and of itself. It may be a necessary evil, but it requires justification. Borders doesn’t address whether that burden was discharged in the Iraq war. I and others do not think that it was.
So called just war theory attempts to provide some sort of Enlightenment template of justification for war. I agree that some measure of standards are in order, (and justification is shapeshifter). However, I don’t think that an increasingly complex and dangerous geopolitical landscape is always amenable to the boilerplate theories of dead classical liberals who contemplated war in the age of muskets. As for the demands for a full-fledged theory of war and libertarian hawkishness, I’m happy for Mr. Palmer to ask the editors of TCS for that much space. Otherwise, the work will be sweeping and rhetorical, as 1000 words isn’t enough space to do any more than paint in broad strokes.
Palmer: Where is the argument that it was justified? Purple prose about an unfleshed-out theory that “rests neither on the foundational axioms associated with traditional moral theories, nor on the nihilism and disorderly assertions of the so-called Postmoderns” does not do the job. Arguments and evidence about threats to the U.S., evidence of WMD, evidence of collusion with Al Qaeda in the 9-11 attacks, and so forth are the stuff of such a justification, not irrelevant claims about Rawlsian constructivism and natural rights.
Many others have launched into the justification on the grounds Palmer mentions. I wasn’t trying to justify the Iraq war so much as to call into question the general libertarian view that self-defense is the only reason to go to war. Iraq was somewhat an afterthough, but one I have many opinions on.
Palmer: P.S. Will Wilkinson has a post discussing Borders’ essay.
I have responded to Mr. Wilkinson’s essay in his comments section, including the weak disanalogy and the mischaracterizations he made.
Some very solid criticism by Tom Palmer.
To my mind, there may well be a good libertarian case for war, but it is certainly not the one delivered by Max Borders in his article.
So, according to Mr. Borders, either Locke’s theory does not include a social contract, or it is not “respectable”…
Here is what Buchanan (who was critic of Locke’s position) had to say:
“John Locke and all of the writers who were responsible for developing the conception of “natural rights” made much of the distinction between the constitutional decision, which determines the rules for collective action, and the operational decision, which determines the shape of collective action within previously chosen rules. The individual, possessing certain inherent or natural rights, enters into a contractual relationship with his fellows, a relationship that is expressed in a constitution. The subsequent obligation of the individual to abide by the decisions made by the collectivity, so long as these are reached constitutionally, lies in his obligation to fulfill the contract once made.”
The Calculus of Consent, Appendix 1 – “Marginal Notes on Reading Political Philosophy”
Since Mr. Borders refers to Hobbes, we should also take into account that even Hobbes considers the “right of nature” although he defines the individuals’ natural rights in such a way that they overlap each other in a state of nature.
So even Hobbes’ contractarian theory, rests, to some extent on a “prior theory of rights” (cf. Leviathan, Chapter XIV).
There are even those, such as Oakeshott, who feel that Hobbes’ theory of rights is compatible with classical liberalism…
Another point: Just War Theory dates back to well before the Enlightenment and the “age of muskets”…
It is disappointing to see personal nastiness and a lack of civility deployed in both Mr Palmer’s critique and Mr Borders’ response. The former will discourage individuals to enter into debate and the latter will prevent the author from stepping back and noting the concerns raised.
Well, I feel a bit stung by the remarks posted immediately above by A Reader. I should have written the remarks at 10:35 pm, let them sit overnight, and posted them the next day with appropriate changes. I apologize if my tone was nasty and uncivil, as that was not my intent.
I tried to deal in the first few lines with the rather baroque style of language that Mr. Borders employed and, much more importantly, with the lack of precision in his language, which is often a sign of a lack of precision in thought. I mentioned the misuse of the term “pace,” which the Oxford English Dictionary defines as “(in stating a contrary opinion) with due deference to (the person named) [Latin, ablative of pax ‘peace’].” The Concise OED goes on to specify that the use of “pace” “means ‘despite (someone’s) opinion’, e.g., *I was not (pace Mr. Smith) defending the legalization of drugs.* It does not mean ‘according to (someone)’ or ‘notwithstanding (something)’.” “Pace” is one of those terms that one sees frequently in high-falutin’ writing, but that is sometimes misunderstood and therefore used to mean its opposite, as in the case of Mr. Borders’ essay. There’s no shame in that, but it’s a sign that insufficient attention is being paid to precise meaning.
I think AAA has answered some of the responses from Mr. Borders, but I will add a few more. First, I am still puzzled by what relationship Mr. Borders’ essay has to important issues of war and peace. It does not deal with how to (or whether we should) overcome the presumption against war that is a central tenet of classical liberalism. (I should point out that other political philosophies have, in contrast, glorified war. The fact that that idea seems so strange to us now is a sign of the remarkable triumph of liberal ideas over the centuries, indeed, over the past fifty years.) That Mr. Borders dismisses just war theory as somehow a product of the Enlightenment (in fact, it has much deeper roots than that; a key contribution, for example, was the doctrine of the double effect articulated by Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologica) is an indication that he doesn’t know what just war theory is. Just war theory is neither “some sort of Enlightenment template of justification for war” nor “the boilerplate theories of dead classical liberals who contemplated war in the age of muskets.” It is very much a living theory and forms the core of all modern discussions of war and peace, including those on which Mr. Borders implicitly relies but which he does not articulate, as in his claim, “I am one of those who doesn’t fancy the idea of staring down the point of a chemical warhead before I decide to act.” I would count myself in the same camp, as would virtually any other person one might care to ask. Not wanting to stare down the point of a chemical warhead is an implicit claim of self-defense, not some kind of radical alternative to thinking about the justice of armed conflict.
Regarding social contract theory, I’m certainly not hostile to it, but I think that the claim that it is somehow an alternative to all substantive thinking about right and wrong is fanciful. If mutual agreement or mutual benefit is the standard, there must be some justification for that that isn’t merely an appeal to mutual agreement or mutual benefit, for that would be circular. Borders is rather imprecise in his characterization of the various contractarians he cites (as AAA showed above); I can’t help but mention that both Locke and Hobbes use “theology” to support their views, and that both also deploy non-theological arguments, as well. Indeed, both rely at bottom on the “law of nature.”
Borders does not clarify the matter of our obligations to people in other countries with which our state may be at war (to take an obviously relevant case) when he writes,
“The overall beauty of social contract theory is that it offers us a justification for political liberalism and pluralism that rests neither on the foundational axioms associated with traditional moral theories, nor on the nihilism and disorderly assertions of the so-called Postmoderns. In short, social contract theory is a constructivist enterprise. And if you stand outside the covenants of Man, you are presumed ‘enemy.'”
If you are outside of, say, the American constitutional order, are you presumed to be an enemy? Are British people thus presumed to be the enemies of Americans? Or does he mean outside of any and all covenants (by which it is not clear whether he means a state, or a culture, or what)? Or is he stating a good Lockean proposition that if you reject all moral restraint and attack humans like an animal would, you may be treated like an animal? His remark has a very triumphalist tone, but it is not at all clear what it means. The interpretation that seemed to make the most sense in the context of his whole essay was that people who are not fellow citizens are enemies; I cannot see how that view is compatible with civilization, much less classical liberalism.
So where does that leave me? I think that Mr. Borders probably does have something interesting to say, but I would encourage him to think it through a bit more carefully before announcing it so excitedly and, when he does so, to spend more time in setting his thoughts out in a careful way. That would include paying attention to more precise characterization of other views before they are swept off the table. Before dismissing just war theory, for example, it would be a good thing to find out what it is, and even better to do so before revealing that you don’t know by calling it “some sort of Enlightenment template of justification for war.”
I’d enjoy reading a longer and more carefully formulated version of Mr. Borders’ thesis. For one thing, I’m just not sure what the thesis is. But he seems like a smart fellow, so I’m willing to bet that there’s something there, if he could only winkle it out.
Just to point out that I respectfully disagree with what “A reader” wrote.
I think neither Tom Palmer nor Max Borders were particularly nasty or lacking in civility in what they wrote.
So, what is a consistent libertarian position on war?
I’ve often thought that one terribley difficult thing to defend when going to war, is the use of taxes obtained from an ex-Iraqi, for example, to fund the bombing of his or her family in Iraq. How do Libertarians justify this?
And what is the solution? The only consistent (radical) position I’ve heard is to let people, and their money, go to causes they believe in, which may be for or against the government’s officially declared ‘good guy’.
Really, this is one (among quite a few) issue of which I haven’t yet formed an opinion.
Tom’s right. I need to sit down and argue this in a 25 page journal article. (Maybe I can could even talk Tom into a critical reading of such a paper if I were to undertake it?)
Anyway, getting too excited in prose is a sign of greenness, which I will admit.
Finally, Tom’s knowledge of the etymology of ‘pace’ actually blows my mind. (Much respect, Tom). -Thanks for the comments.
Pedro certainly doesn’t shy away from raising big questions. Much could be said about the topic, but I’ll merely focus on what I think is important to formulating the issue.
First, it seems to me that the biggest problem for a libertarian would not generally be the use of taxes to fund the military, but the killing of innocents. Any war will entail the death of some (before the fact) unspecified innocents, whether they have been used as shields by the enemy state or are just standing in the wrong place at the wrong time. What could justify undertaking action that would result in the destruction of innocent life? I think in some cases it can be justified, but the argument has to be quite strong. (In my opinion, the toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was justified, but the deaths of completely innocent people have to be acknowledged as a consequence of the policy choice.)
To my mind, at least, the issue of the deaths of innocents is a much more important issue than the use of taxes. The use of coercion to fund a war is also a good reason to oppose the use of war (as is the way in which war generally expands the coercive powers of states, from infringements on speech to taxes, price controls, nationalization, erosion of protections for the criminally accused, and so forth), but there may be some cases in which a purely defensive war could be legitimately funded by taxes on the grounds that the enemy state would surely tax as much or more if they were to conquer you, so on balance the taxpayer would be no worse off. (That argument would be much harder to deploy in wars that are not purely defensive in nature, but then, those wars would also be much harder to justify in the first place.) It’s a thorny issue, but if given the choice of being taxed for defense by the Polish state or being taxed for pure exploitation by the National Socialist conquerors from Germany or the Communist conquerors from the USSR, I think that being taxed by the Polish state would be preferable on libertarian grounds.
Regarding whether citizens should be able to fund armed conflict in other countries, I think that the issue is difficult to resolve in the abstract, without more specific detail. For example, sending money to fund terrorist bombers who deliberately prey on innocents is not merely despicable; it is participation in a criminal act. I don’t think that I have a right to send money to the more radical Irish Republicans, for example, so that they can kill British people, or to send money to radical Jihadists to behead or blow up innocent Muslims, Jews, Christians, and anyone else who doesn’t share their fanaticism. But what about sending money to support some group fighting for independence against an oppressive colonizing state (as was the case in East Timor), when that fight for independence does not deliberately target innocents but when it will entail — as all armed conflict does — harm to innocents who happen to be in the wrong places at the wrong times? There I think that the U.S. government (for example) should stand back and allow the donation to be made. But if it were to turn out that a U.S. citizen had donated the explosives used to blow up the Russian airliners, then — regardless of what one thinks of the case for Chechen independence — that person is a participant in mass murder and should be prosecuted.
That’s not a systematic answer (there’s a large literature on the laws of war that does a much better job), but I hope that it’s helpful to providing a framework for thinking about such matters.
And to Max, I’d be happy to discuss the issus further, although my plate is pretty full for the near future. But do keep thinking about hard issues.