Carrots, Not Sticks
Amid all the talk about the future of the AVF and the problem of maintaining recruitment goals, the Washington Post has run an intelligent discussion of some of the tradeoffs. The background that is not discussed is that the AVF offers a brake on military commitments. The ballot box is not the only check on the deployment of armies; the willingness of people to sign up counts, too. If people won’t sign up for it, the politicians can’t wage a war. At the same time, having to consider the real costs of military manpower makes the generals far more attentive to the interests of soldiers, which is one reason why the casualty rate in Iraq has been a fraction of that in America’s other wars. (Yes, technology plays a part, but the fact that soldiers can’t be conscripted creates incentives to develop and to use that technology to protect them.)
A couple of points – from someone who is opposed to the draft – that you might answer, which may run counter to your argument:
1. the draft helped energize the antiwar movement in the 1960s. Would a draft not have a similar effect now? Or am I misreading the history of the antiwar movement in the 1960s. In other words, by keeping it an AVF, don’t politicians focus the “burden” (even if it’s voluntarily assumed) on poorer, and less politically connected parts of the population?
2. Some have argued that by focusing on force protection, commanders have made the trade-off of avoiding large short-term losses in favor of long-term losses that will come as the U.S. either has to withdraw from a bloody situation, or eventually crush the insurrection. Couldn’t the argument be made otherwise: that by focusing on troops’ and volunteers’ calculations, commanders have made the wrong strategic judgments?
3. We’ve had an AVF since the 1970s, and we’ve conducted three major interventions – Iraq in 1990 , Afghanistan, and Iraq today – and a series of smaller, but bloody interventions including Lebanon and Somalia. Counterfactuals are tough, but maybe you’d argue it could’ve been worse?
“1. the draft helped energize the antiwar movement in the 1960s. Would a draft not have a similar effect now? Or am I misreading the history of the antiwar movement in the 1960s. In other words, by keeping it an AVF, don’t politicians focus the “burden” (even if it’s voluntarily assumed) on poorer, and less politically connected parts of the population?”
You’re right in the sense of the draft causing a backlash, but also note the differences in the political and social climate of the 1960s and ’70s compared to that of today.
The Bush Administration has been pretty successful in packaging this war to be a response to September 11th. And while there is growing disillusionment with the war itself, the premise is still held to be as a counterterrorist action.
There was no (I wasn’t born yet mind you) event that could impact heavier in the minds of Americans compared to the effects of a sustained conflict. So the massive antiwar response arose more quickly because of the obvious illegitimacy of Viet Nam.
But so far, the Bush administration still has enough clout to turn and wave the bloody shirt insofar as finding support for the war. Therefore, a draft will probably find more immediate and staunch oppostion in already antiwar hold outs, like the major cities. Try finding that much backlash in the middle of the country and I think we’ll see less indignation.
There’s certainly a difference in climate. I won’t deny that. But it’d be tough to argue that a draft wouldn’t dramatically change the dynamic. I don’t argue that it would necessarily give rise to a vital antiwar movement. But I suspect it would have some catalytic effect. I’m not arguing a 1-for-1 relationship between the 60s and the 00s. But I’m noting that the draft in early 70s helped to bring a marginal movement into the mainstream.
Of course, popular wars may be different. My understanding of popular sentiment in the 1940s is thin. But, if what we hear in the “Greatest Generation” historiography, if I can call it that, seems to indicate a much more unified homefront in spite of, or maybe, because of the draft.
Tom references “technology” as one reason for “only” about 1700 US military fatalities in Iraq. It would take many, many years to approach the 50,000 American dead in Viet Nam at that rate.
By technology I assume Tom has in mind the improved smart bombs dropped from jets and ships safely out of harm’s way, improved military armor, etc.
Another technological advance (and Tom likely is well aware of this as well) is the medical advances that have led to saving soldiers with wounds that would have been killing 30-40 years ago.
The downside of that technological advance is the incredible numbers of wounded, barely reported, with life-changing wounds who will suffer for this war over the next half-century or more.
RL
Good points (although I’ll dispute one formulation in a moment).
Yes, I do think that conscription can motivate people who would otherwise be complacent to opposition to waging war. That can serve as a check on the waging of war, but it can also make it more likely to take place (especially in a very nationalistic setting) and on a much larger scale. In the present instance, the AVF seems to provide some disincentives to extending the present war to, say, Syria, in ways that a larger conscript army might not.
I’ve little to say about DC’s point no. 2, other than that putting costs on valuables (including the lives of soldiers) leads generally to more rational calculations. Substituting hardware for humans is one outcome; when human life is undervalued because it can be conscripted, the tendency may be to substitute human life for hardware.
Finally, regarding point no. 3, note that the three major wars referenced (Gulf War I, Afghanistan, and Gulf War II) had much, much, much smaller casualties than the wars from 1940 to 1970 (World War II, Korea, and Vietnam). It seems quite likely that the AVF is one reason why.
Regarding RL’s points, let me first take issue with his use of quotation marks. I didn’t write that there were “‘only’ about 1700 US military fatalities in Iraq.” That implies that I suggested that the casualties should be shrugged off. I wrote something very different: “the casualty rate in Iraq has been a fraction of that in America’s other wars.” To say that it is a fraction is to make a statement of fact, not a moral comparison, much less a suggestion that the casualties are somehow trivial or insigificant. I do believe that fewer is better than more (or at least less bad), but not that the number is somehow of “only” trifling significance.
RL is in error in thinking that all I had in mind was smart bombs (which also cause far less harm to innocents, the so-called collateral damage) and better armor; I had in mind the whole range of technologies, including battlefield medicine, better means of stopping blood loss, and the like.
Let’s look at RL’s evaluations of the effects of those life-savings technologies. I cannot imagine that RL actually meant to endorse what is conveyed in the following:
“The downside of that technological advance is the incredible numbers of wounded, barely reported, with life-changing wounds who will suffer for this war over the next half-century or more.”
How can it be a downside of a technological advance that people who would otherwise have died are now alive? It’s a downside of going to war that people are wounded — no doubt about that, but the wounding is not a downside of the technology that saves lives. I happen to know that RL is a very intelligent and talented radiologist. Is it a “downside” of such scientific knowledge and skill that many people who would otherwise have died from cancer now undergo amputations (breast removal, limb removal, etc.) from which they will sufer over the next half-century or more? That would be a strange way to characterize the effects of improved detection and treatment of cancer.
The casualties of war — both fatal and non-fatal — are a result of the decision to go to war. The number and the nature of the casualties are a property of the way that the war is waged. Having fewer total casualties and, of those, a smaller percentage killed, is affected by the ways in which military recruitment (forced or voluntary) provides incentives for military decision makers to take into account the costs to others of their decisions.
One quick note about Mr. Radzinsky’s note above. I agree that the Bush administration misled (“lied” is too strong, as they were careful never to actually state that Saddam caused 9/11, but they certainly suggested it on numerous occasions) us into thinking that the war was about avenging the September 11 attacks. That was one reason why a majority supported the decision to go to war. (Such support would be unlikely to materialize for an attack on Syria.) It would be harder to get people to volunteer on the ground that they would be somehow punishing the people who attacked the U.S.
As to whether improved inducements to volunteer are successful in countering the downward trend in enlistments, well, we’ll see.
I agree with Dr Palmer in the sense that I doubt that the case for any future conflicts (like Syria) will be made on the basis of retaliatory action. The cat is out of the bag now: the Bush administration wants to impose an external global order for the sake of democracy, or whatever value they claim as their own.
After more thought, I think that the case can still be made to a substantial portion of the population on patriotic grounds. Yet the numbers that enlist should that happen will most likely be less than those who enlisted after the Sept. 11 attacks. Iraq has had the perverse effect of showing to a growing majority the horrors of a sustained conflict.
Nope, Bush lied about Iraq to get people fired up, just as FDR lied about Italy to get people fired up by Pearl Harbor (which was casued by US imperialism anyway).
Nope, Bush lied about Iraq to get people fired up, just as FDR lied about Italy to get people fired up by Pearl Harbor (which was casued by US imperialism anyway).
First, a clarification about quotations. I hesitated to type “‘only’ 1700 dead”, as opposed to “only 1700 dead,” for precisely the reason Tom cites. I know *he* did not imply that (even as few as) 1700 dead is nothing to be concerned about. I finally chose to type it as I did because I didn’t want anyone thinking *I* thought 1700 dead was nothing to shrug at. I tried, and failed, to create a phraseology that would both clarify my concern and not make it seem that Tom was not also concerned. I apologize for my failure in this regard.
I am pleased, though not suprised, that Tom was cognizant of the improvements in battlefield medicine and included that in his comments about technological improvements.
And Tom is, further, absolutely correct that surgical and other medical procedures that stave off death are, overall, an improvement, given the alternative.
But there is–I can’t believe Tom would demure–a real sense in which there is a downside here. Three decades after the end of the Civil War, for example, I imagine most people did not daily face thoughts of their loved ones lost in that ancient battle. Life, as they say, is for the living. People move on…those whose loved one’s died. But now, in part due to improved medical technology, many who would have died, come home. But they do not come home whole. We’re not talking about minor wounds that will heal with little or no scarring. We’re talking about faces blown apart, double amputees, paraplegics and quadriplegics, severe brain injuries…
Let me put it this way: we recently witnessed a major conflict of values in America involving Terri Schiavo. 50 years ago, Ms. Schiavo likely would have died 15 years prior to her actual passing. Certainly her parents claim they would have preferred to care for her forever. Many others, self-reflectingly, were glad the decision was not their’s to make. As a result of the Iraq War, there will be many families dealing with life-altering injuries over the next several decades. Is it better than dying? That is for each person to decide, and assuming they could but choose not to commit suicide, “demonstrated preference” provides one answer. But surely Tom isn’t so extreme as to claim I am wrong in nonetheless calling this a “downside” of modern technology, when placed in the context of modern war.
The inadvertently anonymous post above is mine.
Ross Levatter
Ross has clarified his intention with the use of “only” in his comments. I’m not sure one would have best spelled out what he had intended to get across, other than what he’s written immediately above. Now it’s clear to me.
I’ve thought about his point in the last paragraph and I still don’t agree. Some who have been wounded have been grievously harmed and will suffer forever. Others have suffered wounds that heal more easily. Overall, the suffering from this war has been diminished *relative to that of previous wars* and I believe that that is a result of the incentive decision-makers have to take into account the interests of soldiers.
For Ross’s evaluation to be right, we would also have to consider it a downside of modern technology that a higher percentage of burn victims survive, despite the fact that in many cases they suffer terrible pain for the rest of their lives. Their survival seems not to be a downside of life-saving technology, but an example of a benefit that is not as great as one would prefer. (The Schiavo case is different because the woman in question was — as the autopsy seems to have shown — dead mentally, thus constituting merely a burden on others, with no quality of life at all because “she” was not alive.)